Wired for Influence: How Telecom Infrastructure Became a Geopolitical Battleground
Telecommunications infrastructure, once the realm of engineering and business, is now squarely at the heart of global geopolitics. From submarine fibre-optic cables to 5G network gear, and soon 6G, the struggle over who builds, controls, and secures telecom systems has become inseparable from questions of national security, sovereignty, and influence.
One of the most visible flashpoints lies in submarine cables. These undersea networks carry over 95 % of the world's international data traffic, making them vital arteries of global connectivity. As tensions rise between major powers, states are treating these cables not just as commercial investments but as strategic assets.
Proposals to ban certain foreign technologies in cable construction or as landing-site equipment are increasingly common. For example, the U.S. is considering rules to block submarine cables that use specific Chinese technologies, citing risks associated with control, surveillance, or espionage.
Then there is the domestic network gear, including base stations, routers, and transmission towers, all of which are components where trust matters. China, for instance, has tightened its requirements for foreign telecom vendors, such as Nokia and Ericsson. Any contract with foreign firms must now undergo a “black-box” security review by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which requires full disclosure of equipment components and local sourcing. These opaque assessments can take months and almost always favor local suppliers.
For many countries, the choice of vendor is no longer about cost or speed; it’s about securing control over supply chains, firmware updates, and access under political pressure.
Standardization and technical norms are also zones of geopolitical contest. “Open RAN,” which advocates for open, interoperable network components rather than monolithic vendor systems, has evolved not only into a technical standard debate but also into a political tool. Governments that promote open-RAN often aim to reduce their dependency on dominant suppliers, which are seen as potential security risks, especially in critical infrastructure and next-generation networks.
Regional dynamics illustrate how telecom infrastructure policy becomes entangled with diplomacy. In the Indo-Pacific, for instance, several countries are reevaluating their reliance on foreign vendors for 5G infrastructure, driven by concerns over security, surveillance, and geopolitical influence.
The Quad nations (Australia, India, Japan, USA) are collaborating on secure network hardware, standards, and new economic frameworks to ensure that connectivity isn’t a vector for foreign strategic leverage.
Another lesson can be drawn from how infrastructure is legally and institutionally protected. Many governments define fibre-optic cables or subnetworks as “critical infrastructure.” In Africa, tech leaders like Google have urged that fibre-optic cables—both undersea and terrestrial—receive stronger legal protection, security measures, and harmonized policies to safeguard them against vandalism, theft, or geopolitical interference.
Yet there are trade-offs. Over-securing networks or pushing stricter vendor rules can increase costs and slow the deployment of essential services. Developing economies may find themselves squeezed, forced to choose between more expensive trusted suppliers or risk exposure by using cheaper gear with unknown security profiles.
Moreover, there's the risk of network fragmentation: when countries erect fences around their digital borders, global interoperability, shared standards, and even collective defense against cyber threats can be compromised.
In response, some shared measures are taking shape. Transparent supplier assessments, diversified supply chains, collaborative funding of infrastructure projects, and regional or multilateral standards bodies are gaining traction.
Entities such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and others are being urged to align on trusted equipment, cables routing, and servicing protocols so that infrastructure is both resilient and aligned with broader democratic and human rights norms.
Telecom infrastructure is no longer just a matter of tech rollout; it’s a core element of statecraft. Nations that control not only digital service delivery but also the physical infrastructure, including cables, towers, and network equipment, wield significant influence.
As innovation accelerates, so too must vigilance, regulatory clarity, and international cooperation. Failing that, the infrastructure that connects the world could become the next arena of confrontation instead of collaboration.
